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Probably the oldest form of psychiatry which has been recog-
nized in this country with the possible exception of state hospital
management, is the psychiatry practiced in conjunction with the
courts. The need for professional differentiation between those
who are able to stand trial and those who are not so by virtue
of mental disorders was early recognized in the courts. From
time to time the expert has been castigated by the lay press and
those who do not understand psychiatry and the modern prac-
tice of medicine in the courts, who are likely to come to conclu-
sions that are unjustified as to how the psychiatrist serves the
bench ,and the bar.
With the development of the mental hygiene movement, and
particularly with the development of the juvenile court, the need
has not been entirely one of obtaining expert diagnostic opinions,
but has begun to include the idea of treatment for not only the
seriously mentally sick (insane), but also those who fail to be
law-abiding by reason of some less serious medical or psycho-
logical deviation.
Psychiatry in the Civil Courts
In general, the modern practice of psychiatry in the courts
can be classified into civil and criminal. The use of psychiatry in
civil courts still reverts to the old prototype of the alienist who,
given a certain amount of data in the form of a hypothetical
question, has to decide if a testator is able to make a valid. will,
or who testifies whether a particular person having an estate
is able to care properly for it or himself.
If we include in the civil courts the probate aspect which has
to do with the placement of children and their proper care and
upbringing, we find that the functions of the court requiring
expert opinion are greater than they have ever been. One can
hardly conceive of the number of tragedies that must have oc-
curred in past generations in the administering of orphans'
estates and in the arrangement for their care. Even today we
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have tragedies that are hanging over children whose problems
are being solved by probate judges by means contrary to psychi-
atric belief. The general superstition that a child is invariably
better off with his mother, regardless of her mental capacity,
her housekeeping ability, and her ignorance of child care, let
alone her emotional instability, provided only that she be not
guilty of moral turpitude, is a bizarre concept. Passing before
the psychiatrist who deals with children is a long line of com-
pletely inadequate mothers whose children would be better off
in a foster home or under the care of an able housekeeper whose
activities are directed by a loving and competent father. Some
recent experiences that I have had with rural courts enables me
to state with some degree of positiveness that judges are still
being swayed by tradition -and by their own imaginations. This
is not because of any personal mental defect, but rather because
psychology and psychiatry have not, even today, been incorpo-
rated in the education of the lawyer.' Sometimes the judge's
cultural background, his interest in modern things, his attitude
and contacts with social workers and others who deal with human
beings, enables him to rise above this lack. In other cases, par-
ticularly in communities where welfare work and psychiatric
clinics are not sufficiently organized, tragedies occur sometimes
long after a case is adjudicated because of -an unscientific de-
cision of the judge.
What psychiatry has to offer-in the civil courts, beyond these
matters of child placement and guidance of those who have re-
sponsibility for wards of the court, still is largely unrecognized.
Frederick Wertham, 2 points out that a brain autopsy should be
performed where there is a question of the testator's mental
capacity. The findings in arteriosclerosis and senile psychosis
frequently do not even require the use of a microscope to enable
the neuropathologist-psychiatrist to express a valid opinion as
to testamentary capacity.
It is a strange situation that modern psychiatry has not been
called upon more by the civil courts to aid in the evaluation of
testimony. Only too often the delusions of the paranoid hus-
band, who claims that he has been betrayed by his wife, has been
the basis of a divorce decree. I cannot say that it would be well
to keep these people together but certainly the wife should not
have a black mark on her record because of this delusional mate-
rial. In some modern courts, such as the Circuit Court in Wayne
County, Michigan, it is not uncommon for the judge to call in a
1 Cf. Report of Committee on Medical Jurisprudence, American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation 1945.
2 The Brain as an Organ. New York 1934, the MacMillan Co.
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psychiatrist, oftentimes rather unofficially, to express his opinion
on testimony which is being rendered by a person who might be
of unsound mind. The time will come, I am sure, when a person
who is trained in psychiatry, even though he is not a psychiatrist
with a medical background, will be in a position to advise judges
in the medical dynamics of testimony. The deliberate liar should
be diagnosed and the judge should know that a given witness is
that kind of person.
We have got too far now in psychological science to leave de-
cisions as to the accuracy of testimony to "hunches" on the part
of the judge. It is quite true that the judge develops what might
be called a clinical sense. He learns after many years on the
bench, if he is an alert and well qualified person intellectually,
that there are certain things about individuals which indicate
their testimony is not reliable. These things extend beyond the
usual tests of credibility such as the coherence of the testimony
and the agreement of testimony with its context; for instance
the manner, demeanor and conduct of the witness must be taken
into account. The psychological evidence is not given the proper
weight in our courts.
In the civil problem of commitment of the non-criminal insane
we have a whole congeries of problems. In Illinois, attempts are
being made to do away with commitment in its present form.
This does not mean that there is to be no review by a judicial
agency of the fact that the individual has been placed in a mental
hospital. Rather it means that the patient who, through no fault
of his own, has become mentally sick should not have a perma-
nent record by a court of an adjudication which condemns him to
bear the title of an insane person for the rest of his life. It
seems abnormal in this modern and civilized day that one group
of ailments should be singled out from all others to require court
attention. There are, of course, good reasons why this particular
process has come about. One reason is, of course, the fact that
mental cases, not having any insight into their condition, gen-
erally refuse to go to a hospital for treatment of their own ac-
cord. They must be admitted by force, and the American legal
system does not permit the forcing of people to do what they
do not want to do. This would be contrary to all of our tenets
of "freedom". The second reason is, that from the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries there are records of persons who had
large estates being confined to madhouses against their will by
grasping relatives. I sometimes question whether these stories
are entirely true, for the lack of insight on the part of the patient
would make him claim to be of sound mind, and the weakness of
f[Vol. 39
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psychiatric knowledge of those days would make it appear to the
inquisitive or intrusive laymen, who might interest himself in
such a case, that the patient really was not insane and should
be liberated. Only too often, in my own practice, I have seen rela-
tives of patients interfere with proper treatment because they
did not realize how sick their husbands, wives, sisters or others
might be. The psychiatric practitioner may see that the patient
has obviously all -of the characteristic symptoms of a psychosis
but yet the relatives make the bald statement, "He is no more
crazy than I am."
It is to be hoped that soon mental disease will lose its stigma
in the same way that syphilis and tuberculosis have lost their
stigmata in this country-by free discussion which will remove
the feeling of inferiority from which the hospitalized patient
suffers.
Gradually, in many states the commitment procedure is com-
manding the services of skilled psychiatrists rather than general
medical practitioners who are not sensible to the finer points of
diagnosis. This removes even further the possibility of a false
diagnosis. The person unskilled in psychiatry forgets that a
case requiring hospital treatment may not exhibit his symptoms
at all times. From time to time the symptoms may disappear
entirely or take a different form, and most often when the patient
is being interviewed he reaches a pitch of tension which enables
him to overcome his basic delusions or other symptoms so that
he may appear, even to a psychiatrist who sees him only once,
to be mentally sound. Of course, there are cases who are sick
all the time and whose sysmptoms are so characteristic that even
other psychotic persons recognize them.
Psychiatry in the Criminal Courts
In the criminal court the picture is becoming somewhat crys-
tallized and the intrusion of psychiatry has proved its worth,
for that has been the attitude of many judges toward the use of
this medical discipline in the courts.
When courts began formally to use psychiatrists after the first
global war, the latter had a much weaker armamentarium than
they have today. Twenty-five years ago we could have been ac-
cused of using only two' techniques: the first, to lock up the
dangerous persons and the second to pat the harmless person
on the back and give him encouragement. Today we have better
diagnostic techniques, including the electroencephalograph, and,
too, we have much more to offer in the way of treatment.
1949]
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The introduction of psychiatric process into the courts and
corrective institutions has proved of great significance. The
value of medical treatment in this sense cannot be described in
statistical terms. A novelist or writer perhaps would be better
able to show the difference in attitude on the part of courts,
prisons and even the inmates, from the cold blooded scientists.
In spite of the fact that I am very skeptical abQut the application
of chemical tests for intoxication in court procedure when used
by untrained police officers, it is the result of the introduction of
psychiatric and other scientific methods that it was possible to
introduce this type of equipment. It is now even possible in
progressive jurisdictions to use hypnotic drugs and the poly-
graph in order to get at the truth. This is particularly true in
courts where there is a high-standard psychiatric clinic to guard
against the use of such equipment as a bludgeon or as a means
of obtaining confessions instead of the third degree.
The line of demarcation over which psychiatry cannot step
and still hold the respect of courts is still a very sharp one. A
psychiatrist cannot replace a jury even though he has scientific
techniques which will get at the truth better than all of Wig-
more's 3 methods of getting accurate testimony. In most juris-
dictions no matter how great the esteem in which the psychi-
atrist may be held, the judge is very jealous of 4iis prerogative
to sentence and is prone to sentence as he thinks it should be
done rather than apply the sentence scientific techniques indi-
cate should be used for therapeutic purposes.
Pre-trial Forensic Psychiatry
The place of psychiatry in the criminal court is three-fold.
Under the so-called Briggs law in Massachusetts, and under
those laws that have been adopted in other states for the same
end although the means may be different, psychiatry is used to
get the opinion of a disinterested, experienced, scientifically
skilled person to determine whether a person guilty of a serious
offense, usually murder, is of sound mind.
The passage of this type of law has been brought about by the
lack of understanding which laymen have as to the difficulty of
making a finding of "soundness of mind." If a murderer or other
serious offender has such an obvious mental disturbance that
even the laymen can recognize it there is no need for a psychi-
atrist as the defendant will not be brought to trial in most juris-
dictions. Certainly no police officer or prosecuting attorney is
3 Wigmore, John H. Wigmore's Code of the Rules of Eidewe in Trials at Law.
Boston, 1942, Little, Brown & Co.
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fool enough to put a man on the stand and have the newspapers
report the ravings of an unsound mind which would be obvious
to any reader. The vast majority of mentally sick individuals
who have committed serious offenses and who axe brought to
trial are close to the borderline. Their symptoms are such that
the laymen, and oftentimes even the psychiatrically inexperi-
enced physiciai, cannot recognize their problem.
I have testified in a case where I was one of two psychiatrists
for the defense and six of the most prominent psychiatrists in
the same community all testified that the man was sane. I recog-
nized certain symptoms during my interviews which apparently
did not come out in the other examinations. Perhaps repeated
examinations by the prosecution's experts might not have re-
vealed these symptoms to them too. The jury was willing to
take my testimony because the combined testimony of the other
experts equalled mine. In other words, while each found only
one or two of the seven symptoms I listed, between the six of
them all of the seven symptoms were reported. It turned out, a
year later, that the man was so definitely insane that he was
being given electric shock treatment and did not respond to it
It seems to be the opinion of laymen that the psychiatrists who
testify for the defense -are being bribed. I have testified many
times for the defense and I can assure you that the question of
any ulterior motive has never come up, and yet some of the cases
I was sure were insane did not appear to be so either to the
newspaper reporters or in some instances the judge himself until
later developments proved that the psychiatric examination
was right
Sometimes the difference of opinion as to mental soundness
and unsoundness rests upon the use of terms. In one case I tes-
tified that thb patient was suffering from manic-depressive
psychosis and was very depressed. Other evidence revealed that
the development of- the depression had been gradual and that
the patient for a week prior to the commission of the crime,
could not even find her way to and from a corner drug store,
and obviously was very sick. Yet a psychiatrist who testified,
while admitting that this patient was depressed, termed the case
a "situational" depression and claimed that it was not a mental
disease in the sense that it impaired responsibility, that she
could be found guilty. He believed her to be of legally sound
mind at the time the crime was committed. To me this was hair-
splitting, but legitimate hair-splitting because the training of all
psychiatrists is not the same and the clinical experience of all
psychiatrists can not be the same. Too, interpretation of mental
19491
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symptoms in terms of legal responsibility differs with different
experts. This matter of opinion testimony cannot be standard-
ized. All that we can ask for is that the experts' competence and
training be passed upon by some disinterested body such as the
American Board of Neurology and Psychiatry, and that they be
adequately compensated by the State so that the question of
veniality may not be brought up. Certainly there is proper con-
cept under the law to assume that if a man were so sick that he
did not know what he was doing, could not control himself, and
did not know .that what he was doing was wrong, such a defend-
ant could not be considered to have the same need for severe
treatment as a person who deliberately-I use this word in the
layman's sense--commits a crime.
It is obvious then that psychiatric service in preventing juri-
dical misconceptions about the sanity defense does serve a pur-
pose. To be of more value, however, we should hope to educate
the public to understand that psychiatric diagnosis is not a cut-
and-dried thing but that there is a legitimate difference of
opinion among experts, and that there is a difference in the use
of terms as well as a personal psychological difference in the
application of legal definition to medical findings between two
experts.
The Ability to Stand Trial
The second use of the psychiatrist in the criminal court is to
pass upon the mental competence of a defendant. Under the
McNaghten rule4 a person cannot be brought to trial if he is
sufficiently unsound of mind that he does not understand the
nature of the proceedings or that he cannot cooperate properly
with counsel.
Here again the problem which faces the psychiatrist is pri-
marily one of diagnosis: can the patient stand trial; will he
make a fool of himself on the stand; will he, by virtue of mental
disease, be unable to describe what happened at the time he
committed his offense; or will he try to convince the jury that
he has been forced to commit his offense by virtue of the will of
God who talks to him or because of some other extra-normal
experience ?
There can be no hard and fast line here, but the psychiatrist
appointed by the court, having no responsibility to the defense
or prosecution, can bring an unbiased opinion to bear. I have
often felt that here the psychiatrists should be attached to courts
and that outside psychiatrists should not be brought in because
4 Selling, L. S. Diagnostic Crminology, Ann Arbor, 1935, Edwards Brothers. p. 24.
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of their lack of uniformity of experience with the criminal case.
I feel that this type of borderline problem is solved more accu-
rately by depending on the experience of psychiatrists who have
seen similar cases than by anyone whose skill comes from read-
ing textbook descriptions. The question must come up, "How is
this man going to appear on the stand?" If he is only feeble
minded shouldn't we, perhaps, call him insane so he will not
have to be subject to cross-questioning and be unable to answer
by virtue of his mental weakness?
Indeed, it is only humane not to subject these people to the
experience of an open trial and to let them hear themselves being
discussed as of unsound mind and be confronted with the propo-
sition that their ideas are all bosh. Such an experience is
definitely the reverse of therapeutic. If we are to expect these
people to get well after they have been sent to a mental hospital
perhaps we should do something to prevent their having this
experience. I cannot urge that we should have only star chamber
hearings, if a man has committed a serious offense, where the
officers of the court go into camera, and come out with a decision
that he is insane and should be put away. Surely, those who are
interested in the case should have an idea of why a decision of
this sort was reached. Nevertheless, the ideal of a trial for the
mentally sick, in my opinion, has never had any defenders. There
is, without a doubt, a need for revision of our entire judicial
thinking about this, yet I cannot conceive of any better tests
than those which are at present on the statute books. Mental
illness should not be an excuse for evading the responsibility
for an act, but there certainly should be a means of making the
offender law-abiding by curing him of the disorder which caused
his bad behavior.
This, then, brings up a number of problems. Why should a
man who is sick when he is brought to trial, and presumably
sick when he committed his offense, be sent back for trial after
he has been cured? The determination of unsoundness of mind
which makes the man unfit for court appearance carries with it
commitment to a mental hospital, but he has to be returned for
trial. This is not recognized by newspaper reporters and other
laymen who pass upon the work of the courts.
Matters are complicated further by the presence in corrective
or medico-corrective institutions of individuals who are untreat-
able and can never recover and can never be brought back to
trial after a period of years because the witnesses have disap-
peared. Why subject a man to the injustice of holding a trial
over him, particularly if he is harmless yet not well?
1949]
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The use of shock treatment raises another issue at this point.
Depressed cases are apt to commit murder or to attempt
suicide. I have seen several cases of infanticide by mothers who
were depressed. A serious depression comes after childbirth in
a certain number of women. Although depressed cases respond
well to etectro-shock, these people are forced to remain in jail
for a considerable time as most murder cases cannot obtain bond.
With nothing to help recovery under these circumstances the
patient may, by virtue of the fact that he is being held in durance
vile, become worse.
In a case in Detroit an intelligent prosecutor, an able psychia-
trist and broad-minded court made it possible for a woman, who,
in a depression had killed her child, to be sent to a private hos-
pital before she was even arraigned. She was given electro-
shock treatment and made the usual recovery in such cases.
When she was brought to trial she was of sound mind. Under
the Michigan statutes it was mandatory that if she be found "not
guilty by virtue of insanity," which was the logical jury finding
in such a case, she must, nevertheless, be sent to the State Hos-
pital for the criminal insane.
Why should this woman who is now well be sent to a mental
hospital? What will be the criteria for summoning her back to
court? Must she stand trial again? This whole group of ques-
tions has never been answered. To my knowledge the issue of
curing a sick patient who is awaiting trial has never been raised.
The interests of justice and of the community would certainly be
served by curing her and making it unlikely that she would com-
mit a similar offense. If she is sick enough to deserve the
treatment, as determined by her psychiatrist and others in the
hospital, should that not be enough to justify a decision to nolle
prosequip
Post-Trial Therapy
There is a last phase of psychiatry which is possibly more
important to society than any of the previously discussed aspects
of psychiatric medical jurisprudence. That is the application
of psychiatric diagnosis to the convicted offender. Although our
corrective system has up to this time been set up only as a
punitive measure, the idea is slowly coming into our national
consciousness that it is more important to make offenders law-
abiding in the future than merely to allow our emotions to
explode in our reaction to the heinousness of the crime.
Except in those states where the death sentence is still being
invoked most offenders eventually are returned to society and
it well behooves us to try to make a decision as to what should
[Vol 39
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be done with these people in view of that fact. If they are to be
put on probation that form of treatment is intended to make
them law-abiding. If they are to be sent to a corrective institu-
tion one should look very carefully to see that what happens to
them there will return a socially adjusted individual to his com-
munity. Unfortunately, this is seldom the case. Even in those
penal institutions where psychiatry has gained a foothold, funds
and personnel have not been available to introduce a distinctly
therapeutic atmosphere.
In hospitals for the criminal insane the situation is some-
what different because the evidence of mental disease in their
inmates is quite obvious, so that medical and psychiatric. treat-
ment can be directed toward the cure of the ailment and the pre-
sumption is, that the mental illness is the cause of the offense
and the removal of that illness will make the person law-abiding
in the future.
In a prison the existence of mental illness is not so clearly
cut. The economic and other causes of crime overshadow, in
the "practical" mind, the basic psychological deviation. Until
the environmental factors are better controlled it must be obvi-
ous that only small inroads can be made into the problem as
decades go on. We must face the fact it is only since the first
global war that any scientific approach has been made to crim-
inology. Gross, Garofalo, and Lombroso and the others who are
considered the classics in criminology were only able to ppint
to primitive socio-psychological findings. They were too few in
number, too radical in their beliefs for their time and too much
shut up in their ivory towers to command attention from the
"practical" present-day administrator and politician. Even
today we cannot expect our highly trained psychiatric physician
to know all of the odds and ends of political maneuvering in
order to correct prison conditions or make great changes in the
social conditions which produce crime.
Any knowing person must admit that there can be only a small
number of cases who, through direct treatment on the part of the
psychiatric staff of the prison, can profit by therapy.
On the other hand the court has a great opportunity. The
court is in a position, if it has scientifically trained help, to evalu-
ate the violator standing before him. A person who has trans-
gressed is yet very definitely a person. Through such relatively
novel psychiatric means as probation prediction tables and
charts, the use of intelligence tests, the use of subtler diagnostic
methods like the Rorschach test and the thematic apperception
test we are gaining deeper insight into the problem person. The
1949)
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psychiatric interview probes more deeply through the contribu-
tions of psychoanalysis.
It is not possible to give a thorough psychoanalysis to every
offender nor would it be profitable. Time spent with a man who
is merely going to go out and be law-abiding and who will make
no further contribution to society than keeping out of the hands
of the police, is almost wasted. It is much better to have
psychiatrists treat neurotics, artists, physicians or even skilled
workmen. On the other hand much can be done with simple
therapy. My own experience in using ordinary directive psycho-
therapy with probationers, children in corrective schools and
adults in prisons has confirmed in me the belief that a little
psychiatric treatment goes a long way, but of course the more
that can be given the better the result. We must not forget the
findings of Roethlisberger and Dickson.5 Their research in
industry demonstrated that merely the giving of attention to a
group of workers could raise production and enable these work-
ers to make a better adjustment within the plant. The expansion
of this research into the counseling services in industry was
equally revealing for it took from the worker the stigma of
anonymity and made him a person. Similarly even a little
psychiatric treatment given a person under probation or in the
courts or institutions produces results.
Finally, even the psychiatrist must admit that there are indi-
viduals who are not treatable. For these people, prison is not
the answer. It is sufficient that they be kept in custody. There
is no reason why they cannot lead a pleasant life and perhaps
be made to make a contribution to society by working in shops or
offices within custodial areas. Since the psychiatrist cannot be
optimistic about the outlook why not confine these people not as
punishment but in an attempt to gain something from them to
repay for the harm they have doneI
Conclusion
We can close this very brief discussion by pointing out that:
(1) Psychiatry can be used in the courts to aid the judge in
evaluating testimony;
(2) It is useful in the civil courts to advise the judge in the
proper therapeutic handling of wards of the court or persons
whose cases are coming under judication in order that children
particularly, but also incompetent persons, may be guided into
5 Roethlisberger, F. J. and Dickson, W. J., Management and the Worker, Cam-
bridge, 1940. Harvard University Press.
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proper treatment so their lives will be adequate and pleasant
and society will gain some from their existence;
(3) An early psychiatric evaluation on criminal cases is indi-
cated in order to protest both the court and the defendant;
(4) The rules of responsibility and the statutes which define
the mental condition of the individual with regard to his guilt,
and his ability to stand trial must be completely re-evaluated in
terms of modern treatment;
(5) After conviction the purpose of all court procedure would
be to make the individual law-abiding. With this consideration
uppermost in mind, the functions of probation and corrective
institutions must be completely re-evaluated in the light of the
contributions that psychiatry is able to make.
